Hopkins v. Andaya (9th Cir. 1992) 958 F.2nd 881, 887; holding that an officer's second use of deadly force was unreasonable even though the suspect had violently assaulted the officer a few minutes before, but by the time of the second use of deadly force, although he was advancing towards the officer, he was wounded and unarmed.
The force used must still be no greater than necessary under the circumstances. (Deorle v. Rutherford (9th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3rd 1119;
в общем применение оружия на поражение в штатах полицейским регламентируется такими случаями:
Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers:
Attacking a police officer with a deadly weapon justifies the officer's use of deadly force in response:
Where the suspect violently resisted arrest, physically attacked the officer, and grabbed the officer's gun. (Billington v. Smith (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3rd 1177, 1185.)
Where a suspect, who had been behaving erratically, swung a knife at an officer. (Reynolds v. County of San Diego (9th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3rd 1162, 1168.)
Pointing a gun at a police officer. (See Scott v. Henrick (9th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3rd 912, 914.)
When the suspect attacked an officer with a rock and a stick. (Garcia v. United States (9th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2nd 806, 812.)
However, the mere fact alone that a person possesses a deadly weapons does not justify the used of deadly force. (Harris v. Roderick (9th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3rd 1189, 1202.)
See also Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police (9th Cir. 1991) 952 F.2nd 321, 324-325; holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot.
And Ting v. United States (9th Cir. 1991) 927 F.2nd 1504, 1508-1511; Use of deadly force unreasonable when the suspect had already dropped his gun.
The use of a police dog may be "deadly force." (Smith v. City of Hemet (2005) 394 F.3rd 689; overruling prior authority to the contrary and defining deadly force as "force that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.") But it depends upon the circumstances. (Thompson v. County of Los Angeles (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 154.)
See "Deadly Force, Defined," above.
When the fleeing felon was known to have shot a victim in the course of a burglary from which he was escaping, the use of deadly force to stop him is justified. (Forrett v. Richardson (9th Cir. 1997) 112 F.3rd 416, 420.)
A high-speed pursuit may or may not allow for the use of deadly force, each case depending upon its individual circumstances. (Brosseau v. Haugen (2004) 543 U.S. 194 [160 L.Ed.2nd 583]; finding that an officer who shot a suspect who was attempting to flee in his vehicle did not have "fair notice" based upon the conflicting case law as to whether the force she used was excessive. She was therefore entitled to "qualified immunity" from civil suit.)
Ending a dangerous high speed vehicle chase with speeds in excess of 85 miles per hour, where the suspect was driving recklessly and forcing other motorists off the road, by bumping the suspect's car and pushing him off the road severely injuring him, is reasonable force. Also, there is no duty to break off the chase. (Scott v. Harris (2007) __ U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 1769; 167 L.Ed.2nd 686].)