Глобальные прогнозы

[Skylight]

Stratfor Global Intelligence

The Decade Ahead

The world has been restructuring itself since 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia and the subprime financial crisis struck. Three patterns have emerged. First, the European Union entered a crisis that it could not solve and that has increased in intensity. We predict that the European Union will never return to its previous unity, and if it survives it will operate in a more limited and fragmented way in the next decade. We do not expect the free trade zone to continue to operate without increasing protectionism. We expect Germany to suffer severe economic reversals in the next decade and Poland to increase its regional power as a result.

The current confrontation with Russia over Ukraine will remain a centerpiece of the international system over the next few years, but we do not think the Russian Federation can exist in its current form for the entire decade. Its overwhelming dependence on energy exports and the unreliability of expectations on pricing make it impossible for Moscow to sustain its institutional relations across the wide swathe of the Russian Federation. We expect Moscow's authority to weaken substantially, leading to the formal and informal fragmentation of Russia. The security of Russia's nuclear arsenal will become a prime concern as this process accelerates later in the decade.

We have entered a period in which the decline of the nation-states created by Europe in North Africa and the Middle East is accelerating. Power is no longer held by the state in many countries, having devolved to armed factions that can neither defeat others nor be defeated. This has initiated a period of intense internal fighting. The United States is prepared to mitigate the situation with air power and limited forces on the ground but will not be able or willing to impose a settlement. Turkey, whose southern border is made vulnerable by this fighting, will be slowly drawn into the fighting. By the end of this decade, Turkey will emerge as the major regional power, and Turkish-Iranian competition will increase as a result.

China has completed its cycle as a high-growth, low-wage country and has entered a new phase that is the new normal. This phase includes much slower growth and an increasingly powerful dictatorship to contain the divergent forces created by slow growth. China will continue to be a major economic force but will not be the dynamic engine of global growth it once was. That role will be taken by a new group of highly dispersed countries we call the Post-China 16, which includes much of Southeast Asia, East Africa and parts of Latin America. China will not be an aggressive military force either. Japan remains the most likely contender for the dominant position in East Asia, both because of its geography and because of its needs as a massive importer.

The United States will continue to be the major economic, political and military power in the world but will be less engaged than in the past. Its low rate of exports, its increasing energy self-reliance and its experiences over the last decade will cause it to be increasingly cautious about economic and military involvement in the world. It has learned what happens to heavy exporters when customers cannot or will not buy their products. It has learned the limits of power in trying to pacify hostile countries. It has learned that North America is an arena in which it can prosper with selective engagements elsewhere. It will face major strategic threats with proportional power, but it will not serve the role of first responder as it has in recent years.

It will be a disorderly world, with a changing of the guard in many regions. The one constant will be the continued and maturing power of the United States — a power that will be much less visible and that will be utilized far less in the next decade.

Europe

The European Union will be unable to solve its fundamental problem, which is not the eurozone, but the free trade zone. Germany is the center of gravity of the European Union; it exports more than 50 percent of its GDP, and half of that goes to other EU countries. Germany has created a productive capability that vastly outstrips its ability to consume, even if the domestic economy were stimulated. It depends on these exports to maintain economic growth, full employment and social stability. The European Union's structures — including the pricing of the euro and many European regulations — are designed to facilitate this export dependency.

This has already fragmented Europe into at least two parts. Mediterranean Europe and countries such as Germany and Austria have completely different behavioral patterns and needs. No single policy can suit all of Europe. This has been the core problem from the beginning, but it has now reached an extreme point. What benefits one part of Europe harms another.

Nationalism has already risen significantly. Compounding this is the Ukrainian crisis and Eastern European countries' focus on the perceived threat from Russia. Eastern Europe's concern about Russia creates yet another Europe — four, total, if we separate the United Kingdom and Scandinavia from the rest of Europe. Considered with the rise of Euroskeptic parties on the right and left, the growing delegitimation of mainstream parties and the surging popularity of separatist parties within European countries, the fragmentation and nationalism that we forecast in 2005, and before, is clearly evident.

These trends will continue. The European Union might survive in some sense, but European economic, political and military relations will be governed primarily by bilateral or limited multilateral relationships that will be small in scope and not binding. Some states might maintain a residual membership in a highly modified European Union, but this will not define Europe.

What will define Europe in the next decade is the re-emergence of the nation-state as the primary political vehicle of the continent. Indeed the number of nation-states will likely increase as various movements favoring secession, or the dissolution of states into constituent parts, increase their power. This will be particularly noticeable during the next few years, as economic and political pressures intensify amid Europe's crisis.

Germany has emerged from this mass of nation-states as the most economically and politically influential. Yet Germany is also extremely vulnerable. It is the world's fourth-largest economic power, but it has achieved that status by depending on exports. Export powers have a built-in vulnerability: They depend on their customers' desire and ability to buy their products. In other words, Germany's economy is hostage to the economic well-being and competitive environment in which it operates.

There are multiple forces working against Germany in this regard. First, Europe's increasing nationalism will lead to protectionist capital and labor markets. Weaker countries are likely to adopt various sorts of capital controls, while stronger countries will limit the movement of foreigners — including the citizens of other EU countries — across their borders. We forecast that existing protectionist policies inside the European Union, particularly on agriculture, will be supplemented in coming years by trade barriers created by the weaker Southern European economies that need to rebuild their economic base after the current depression. On a global basis, we can expect European exports to face increased competition and highly variable demand in the uncertain environment. Therefore, our forecast is that Germany will begin an extended economic decline that will lead to a domestic social and political crisis and that will reduce Germany's influence in Europe during the next 10 years.

At the center of economic growth and increasing political influence will be Poland. Poland has maintained one of the most impressive growth profiles outside of Germany and Austria. In addition, though its population is likely to contract, the contraction will most probably be far less than in other European countries. As Germany undergoes wrenching shifts in economy and population, Poland will diversify its own trade relationships to emerge as the dominant power on the strategic Northern European Plain. Moreover, we expect Poland to be the leader of an anti-Russia coalition that would, significantly, include Romania during the first half of this decade. In the second half of the decade, this alliance will play a major role in reshaping the Russian borderlands and retrieving lost territories through informal and formal means. Eventually as Moscow weakens, this alliance will become the dominant influence not only in Belarus and Ukraine, but also farther east. This will further enhance Poland's and its allies' economic and political position.

Poland will benefit from having a strategic partnership with the United States. Whenever a leading global power enters into a relationship with a strategic partner, it is in the global power's interest to make the partner as economically vigorous as possible, both to stabilize its society and to make it capable of building a military force. Poland will be in that position with the United States, as will Romania. Washington has made its interest in the region obvious.

[Skylight]

Russia

It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will survive in its current form. Russia's failure to transform its energy revenue into a self-sustaining economy makes it vulnerable to price fluctuations. It has no defense against these market forces. Given the organization of the federation, with revenue flowing to Moscow before being distributed directly or via regional governments, the flow of resources will also vary dramatically. This will lead to a repeat of the Soviet Union's experience in the 1980s and Russia's in the 1990s, in which Moscow's ability to support the national infrastructure declined. In this case, it will cause regions to fend for themselves by forming informal and formal autonomous entities. The economic ties binding the Russian periphery to Moscow will fray.

Historically, the Russians solved such problems via the secret police — the KGB and its successor, the Federal Security Services (FSB). But just as in the 1980s, the secret police will not be able to contain the centrifugal forces pulling regions away from Moscow this decade. In this case, the FSB's power is weakened by its leadership's involvement in the national economy. As the economy falters, so does the FSB's strength. Without the FSB inspiring genuine terror, the fragmentation of the Russian Federation will not be preventable.

To Russia's west, Poland, Hungary and Romania will seek to recover regions lost to the Russians at various points. They will work to bring Belarus and Ukraine into this fold. In the south, the Russians' ability to continue controlling the North Caucasus will evaporate, and Central Asia will destabilize. In the northwest, the Karelian region will seek to rejoin Finland. In the Far East, the maritime regions more closely linked to China, Japan and the United States than to Moscow will move independently. Other areas outside of Moscow will not necessarily seek autonomy but will have it thrust upon them. This is the point: There will not be an uprising against Moscow, but Moscow's withering ability to support and control the Russian Federation will leave a vacuum. What will exist in this vacuum will be the individual fragments of the Russian Federation.

This will create the greatest crisis of the next decade. Russia is the site of a massive nuclear strike force distributed throughout the hinterlands. The decline of Moscow's power will open the question of who controls those missiles and how their non-use can be guaranteed. This will be a major test for the United States. Washington is the only power able to address the issue, but it will not be able to seize control of the vast numbers of sites militarily and guarantee that no missile is fired in the process. The United States will either have to invent a military solution that is difficult to conceive of now, accept the threat of rogue launches, or try to create a stable and economically viable government in the regions involved to neutralize the missiles over time. It is difficult to imagine how this problem will play out. However, given our forecast on the fragmentation of Russia, it follows that this issue will have to be addressed, likely in the next decade.

The issue in the first half of the decade will be how far the alliance stretching between the Baltic and Black seas will extend. Logically, it should reach Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. Whether it does depends on what we have forecast for the Middle East and Turkey.

The Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East — particularly the area between the Levant and Iran, along with North Africa — is experiencing national breakdowns. By this we mean that the nation-states established by European powers in the 19th and 20th centuries are collapsing into their constituent factions defined by kinship, religion or shifting economic interests. In countries like Libya, Syria and Iraq, we have seen the devolution of the nation-state into factions that war on each other and that cross the increasingly obsolete borders of countries.

This process follows the model of Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, when the central government ceased to function and power devolved to warring factions. The key factions could not defeat the others, nor could they themselves be defeated. They were manipulated and supported from the outside, as well as self-supporting. The struggle among these factions erupted into a civil war — one that has quieted but not ended. As power vacuums persist throughout the region, jihadist groups will find space to operate but will be contained in the end by their internal divisions.

This situation cannot be suppressed by outside forces. The amount of force required and the length of deployment would outstrip the capacity of the United States, even if dramatically expanded. Given the situation in other parts of the world, particularly in Russia, the United States can no longer focus exclusively on this region.

At the same time, this evolution, particularly in the Arab states south of Turkey, represents a threat to regional stability. The United States will act to mitigate the threat of particular factions, which will change over time, through the use of limited force. But the United States will not deploy multidivisional forces to the region. At this point, most countries in the area still expect the United States to act as the decisive force even though they witnessed the United States fail in this role in the past decade. Nevertheless, expectations shift more slowly than reality.

As the reality sinks in, it will emerge that, because of its location, only one country has an overriding interest in stabilizing Syria and Iraq, is able to act broadly — again because of its location — and has the means to at least achieve limited success in the region. That country is Turkey. At this point, Turkey is surrounded by conflicts in the Arab world, in the Caucasus and in the Black Sea Basin. But Turkey has avoided taking risks so far.

Turkey will continue to need U.S. involvement for political and military reasons. The United States will oblige, but there will be a price: participation in the containment of Russia. The United States does not expect Turkey to assume a war-fighting role and does not intend one for itself. It does, however, want a degree of cooperation in managing the Black Sea. Turkey will not be ready for a completely independent policy in the Middle East and will pay the price for a U.S. relationship. That price will open the path to extending the containment line to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

We expect the instability in the Arab world to continue through the decade. We also expect Turkey to be drawn in to the south, inasmuch as its fears of fighting so close to its border — and the political outcomes of that fighting — will compel it to get involved. It will intervene as little as possible and as slowly as possible, but it will intervene, and its intervention will eventually increase in size and breadth. Whatever its reluctance, Turkey cannot withstand years of chaos across its border, and there will be no other country to carry the burden. Iran is not in a position geographically or militarily to perform this function, nor is Saudi Arabia. Turkey is likely to try to build shifting coalitions ultimately reaching into North Africa to stabilize the situation. Turkish-Iranian competition will grow with time, but Turkey will keep its options open to work with both Iran and Saudi Arabia as needed. Whatever the dynamic, Turkey will be at the center of it.

This will not be the only region drawing Turkey's attention. As Russia weakens, European influence will begin inching eastward into areas where Turkey has historical interests, such as the northern shore of the Black Sea. We can foresee Turkey projecting its power northward certainly commercially and politically but also potentially in some measured military way. Moreover, as the European Union fragments and individual economies weaken or some nations become oriented toward the East, Turkey will increase its presence in the Balkans as the only remaining power able to do so.

Before this can happen, Turkey must find a domestic political balance. It is both a secular and Muslim country. The current government has attempted to bridge the gap, but in many ways it has tilted away from the secularists, of whom there are many. A new government will certainly emerge over the coming years. This is a permanent fault line in contemporary Turkey. Like many countries, its power will expand in the midst of political uncertainty. Alongside this internal political conflict, the military, intelligence and diplomatic service will need to evolve in size and function during the coming decade. That said, we expect to see an acceleration of Turkey's emergence as a major regional power in the next 10 years.

[Ангел]

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[Skylight]

From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine

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By George Friedman

As I discussed last week, the fundamental problem that Ukraine poses for Russia, beyond a long-term geographical threat, is a crisis in internal legitimacy. Russian President Vladimir Putin has spent his time in power rebuilding the authority of the Russian state within Russia and the authority of Russia within the former Soviet Union. The events in Ukraine undermine the second strategy and potentially the first. If Putin cannot maintain at least Ukrainian neutrality, then the world's perception of him as a master strategist is shattered, and the legitimacy and authority he has built for the Russian state is, at best, shaken.

Whatever the origins of the events in Ukraine, the United States is now engaged in a confrontation with Russia. The Russians believe that the United States was the prime mover behind regime change in Ukraine. At the very least, the Russians intend to reverse events in Ukraine. At most, the Russians have reached the conclusion that the United States intends to undermine Russia's power. They will resist. The United States has the option of declining confrontation, engaging in meaningless sanctions against individuals and allowing events to take their course. Alternatively, the United States can choose to engage and confront the Russians.

A failure to engage at this point would cause countries around Russia's periphery, from Estonia to Azerbaijan, to conclude that with the United States withdrawn and Europe fragmented, they must reach an accommodation with Russia. This will expand Russian power and open the door to Russian influence spreading on the European Peninsula itself. The United States has fought three wars (World War I, World War II and the Cold War) to prevent hegemonic domination of the region. Failure to engage would be a reversal of a century-old strategy.

The American dilemma is how to address the strategic context in a global setting in which it is less involved in the Middle East and is continuing to work toward a "pivot to Asia." Nor can the United States simply allow events to take their course. The United States needs a strategy that is economical and coherent militarily, politically and financially. It has two advantages. Some of the countries on Russia's periphery do not want to be dominated by her. Russia, in spite of some strengths, is inherently weak and does not require U.S. exertion on the order of the two World Wars, the Cold War or even the Middle East engagements of the past decade.

The Russian and U.S. Positions

I discussed Russian options on Ukraine last week. Putin is now in a position where, in order to retain with confidence his domestic authority, he must act decisively to reverse the outcome. The problem is there is no single decisive action that would reverse events. Eventually, the inherent divisions in Ukraine might reverse events. However, a direct invasion of eastern Ukraine would simply solidify opposition to Russia in Kiev and trigger responses internationally that he cannot predict. In the end, it would simply drive home that although the Russians once held a dominant position in all of Ukraine, they now hold it in less than half. In the long run, this option — like other short-term options — would not solve the Russian conundrum.

Whatever Putin does in Ukraine, he has two choices. One is simply to accept the reversal, which I would argue that he cannot do. The second is to take action in places where he might achieve rapid diplomatic and political victories against the West — the Baltics, Moldova or the Caucasus — while encouraging Ukraine's government to collapse into gridlock and developing bilateral relations along the Estonia-Azerbaijan line. This would prevent a U.S. strategy of containment — a strategy that worked during the Cold War and one that the Europeans are incapable of implementing on their own. This comes down to the Americans.

The United States has been developing, almost by default, a strategy not of disengagement but of indirect engagement. Between 1989 and 2008, the U.S. strategy has been the use of U.S. troops as the default for dealing with foreign issues. From Panama to Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States followed a policy of direct and early involvement of U.S. military forces. However, this was not the U.S. strategy from 1914 to 1989. Then, the strategy was to provide political support to allies, followed by economic and military aid, followed by advisers and limited forces, and in some cases pre-positioned forces. The United States kept its main force in reserve for circumstances in which (as in 1917 and 1942 and, to a lesser degree, in Korea and Vietnam) allies could not contain the potential hegemon. Main force was the last resort.

This was primarily a strategy of maintaining the balance of power. The containment of the Soviet Union involved creating an alliance system comprising countries at risk of Soviet attack. Containment was a balance of power strategy that did not seek the capitulation of the Soviet Union as much as increasing the risks of offensive action using allied countries as the first barrier. The threat of full U.S. intervention, potentially including nuclear weapons, coupled with the alliance structure, constrained Soviet risk-taking.

Because the current Russian Federation is much weaker than the Soviet Union was at its height and because the general geographic principle in the region remains the same, a somewhat analogous balance of power strategy is likely to emerge after the events in Ukraine. Similar to the containment policy of 1945-1989, again in principle if not in detail, it would combine economy of force and finance and limit the development of Russia as a hegemonic power while exposing the United States to limited and controlled risk.

The coalescence of this strategy is a development I forecast in two books, The Next Decade and The Next 100 Years, as a concept I called the Intermarium. The Intermarium was a plan pursued after World War I by Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski for a federation, under Poland's aegis, of Central and Eastern European countries. What is now emerging is not the Intermarium, but it is close. And it is now transforming from an abstract forecast to a concrete, if still emergent, reality

[Skylight]

Forces Leading to the Alliance's Emergence

A direct military intervention by the United States in Ukraine is not possible. First, Ukraine is a large country, and the force required to protect it would outstrip U.S. capabilities. Second, supplying such a force would require a logistics system that does not exist and would take a long time to build. Finally, such an intervention would be inconceivable without a strong alliance system extending to the West and around the Black Sea. The United States can supply economic and political support, but Ukraine cannot counterbalance Russia and the United States cannot escalate to the point of using its own forces. Ukraine is a battleground on which Russian forces would have an advantage and a U.S. defeat would be possible.

If the United States chooses to confront Russia with a military component, it must be on a stable perimeter and on as broad a front as possible to extend Russian resources and decrease the probability of Russian attack at any one point out of fear of retaliation elsewhere. The ideal mechanism for such a strategy would be NATO, which contains almost all of the critical countries save Azerbaijan and Georgia. The problem is that NATO is not a functional alliance. It was designed to fight the Cold War on a line far to the west of the current line. More important, there was unity on the principle that the Soviet Union represented an existential threat to Western Europe.

That consensus is no longer there. Different countries have different perceptions of Russia and different concerns. For many, a replay of the Cold War, even in the face of Russian actions in Ukraine, is worse than accommodation. In addition, the end of the Cold War has led to a massive drawdown of forces in Europe. NATO simply lacks the force unless there is a massive and sudden buildup. That will not occur because of the financial crisis, among other reasons. NATO requires unanimity to act, and that unanimity is not there.

The countries that were at risk from 1945 to 1989 are not the same as those at risk today. Many of these countries were part of the Soviet Union then, and the rest were Soviet satellites. The old alliance system was not built for this confrontation. The Estonia-Azerbaijan line has as its primary interest retaining sovereignty in the face of Russian power. The rest of Europe is not in jeopardy, and these countries are not prepared to commit financial and military efforts to a problem they believe can be managed with little risk to them. Therefore, any American strategy must bypass NATO or at the very least create new structures to organize the region.

Characteristics of the Alliance

Each of the various countries involved is unique and has to be addressed that way. But these countries share the common danger that events in Ukraine could spread and directly affect their national security interests, including internal stability. As I observed, the Baltics, Moldova and the Caucasus are areas where the Russians could seek to compensate for their defeat. Because of this, and also because of their intrinsic importance, Poland, Romania and Azerbaijan must be the posts around which this alliance is built.

The Baltic salient, 145 kilometers (90 miles) from St. Petersburg in Estonia, would be a target for Russian destabilization. Poland borders the Baltics and is the leading figure in the Visegrad battlegroup, an organization within the European Union. Poland is eager for a closer military relationship with the United States, as its national strategy has long been based on third-power guarantees against aggressors. The Poles cannot defend themselves and the Baltics, given the combat capabilities necessary for the task.

The Dniester River is 80 kilometers from Odessa, the main port on the Black Sea for Ukraine and an important one for Russia. The Prut River is about 200 kilometers from Bucharest, the capital of Romania. Moldova is between these two rivers. It is a battleground region, at least of competing political factions. Romania must be armed and supported in protecting Moldova and in organizing southeastern Europe. In Western hands, Moldova threatens Odessa, Ukraine's major port also used by Russia on the Black Sea. In Russian hands, Moldova threatens Bucharest.

At the far end of the alliance structure I am envisioning is Azerbaijan, on the Caspian Sea bordering Russia and Iran. Should Dagestan and Chechnya destabilize, Azerbaijan — which is Islamic and majority Shiite but secular — would become critical for limiting the regional spread of jihadists. Azerbaijan also would support the alliance's position in the Black Sea by supporting Georgia and would serve as a bridge for relations (and energy) should Western relations with Iran continue to improve. To the southwest, the very pro-Russian Armenia — which has a Russian troop presence and a long-term treaty with Moscow — could escalate tensions with Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. Previously, this was not a pressing issue for the United States. Now it is. The security of Georgia and its ports on the Black Sea requires Azerbaijan's inclusion in the alliance.

Azerbaijan serves a more strategic purpose. Most of the countries in the alliance are heavy importers of Russian energy; for instance, 91 percent of Poland's energy imports and 86 percent of Hungary's come from Russia. There is no short-term solution to this problem, but Russia needs the revenue from these exports as much as these countries need the energy. Developing European shale and importing U.S. energy is a long-term solution. A medium-term solution, depending on pipeline developments that Russia has tended to block in the past, is sending natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. Until now, this has been a commercial issue, but it has become a strategically critical issue. The Caspian region, of which Azerbaijan is the lynchpin, is the only major alternative to Russia for energy. Therefore, rapid expansion of pipelines to the heart of Europe is as essential as providing Azerbaijan with the military capability to defend itself (a capability it is prepared to pay for and, unlike other allied countries, does not need to be underwritten).

The key to the pipeline will be Turkey's willingness to permit transit. I have not included Turkey as a member of this alliance. Its internal politics, complex relations and heavy energy dependence on Russia make such participation difficult. I view Turkey in this alliance structure as France in the Cold War. It was aligned yet independent, militarily self-sufficient yet dependent on the effective functioning of others. Turkey, inside or outside of the formal structure, will play this role because the future of the Black Sea, the Caucasus and southeastern Europe is essential to Ankara.

These countries, diverse as they are, share a desire not to be dominated by the Russians. That commonality is a basis for forging them into a functional military alliance. This is not an offensive force but a force designed to deter Russian expansion. All of these countries need modern military equipment, particularly air defense, anti-tank and mobile infantry. In each case, the willingness of the United States to supply these weapons, for cash or credit as the situation requires, will strengthen pro-U.S. political forces in each country and create a wall behind which Western investment can take place. And it is an organization that others can join, which unlike NATO does not allow each member the right to veto.

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The Practicality of the U.S. Strategy

There are those who would criticize this alliance for including members who do not share all the democratic values of the U.S. State Department. This may be true. It is also true that during the Cold War the United States was allied with the Shah's Iran, Turkey and Greece under dictatorship and Mao's China after 1971. Having encouraged Ukrainian independence, the United States — in trying to protect that independence and the independence of other countries in the region — is creating an alliance structure that will include countries, such as Azerbaijan, that have been criticized. However, if energy does not come from Azerbaijan, it will come from Russia, and then the Ukrainian events will dissolve into tragic farce. The State Department must grapple with the harsh forces its own policies have unleashed. This suggests that the high-mindedness borne of benign assumptions now proven to be illusions must make way for realpolitik calculations.

The balance of power strategy allows the United States to use the natural inclination of allies to bolster its own position and take various steps, of which military intervention is the last, not the first. It recognizes that the United States, as nearly 25 percent of the world's economy and the global maritime hegemon, cannot evade involvement. Its very size and existence involves it. Nor can the United States confine itself to gestures like sanctions on 20 people. This is not seen as a sign of resolve as much as weakness. It does mean that as the United States engages in issues like Ukraine and must make strategic decisions, there are alternatives to intervention — such as alliances. In this case, a natural alliance structure presents itself — a descendant of NATO but shaped for this crisis, much like the alliance I forecast previously.

In my view, Russian power is limited and has flourished while the United States was distracted by its wars in the Middle East and while Europe struggled with its economic crisis. That does not mean Russia is not dangerous. It has short-term advantages, and its insecurity means that it will take risks. Weak and insecure states with temporary advantages are dangerous. The United States has an interest in acting early because early action is cheaper than acting in the last extremity. This is a case of anti-air missiles, attack helicopters, communications systems and training, among other things. These are things the United States has in abundance. It is not a case of deploying divisions, of which it has few. The Poles, Romanians, Azerbaijanis and certainly the Turks can defend themselves. They need weapons and training, and that will keep Russia contained within its cauldron as it plays out a last hand as a great power.

[Skylight]

Пять «эпокалипсических» прогнозов на 2016 год

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Всемирный банк и МВФ смотрят в 2016 год с оптимизмом, прогнозируя ускорение роста мировой экономики. Однако именитые финансисты разразились серией призывов готовиться к худшим временам, предвещая в наступившем году «катаклизмы», «эпокалипсис» и «страшный суд».
Цены на сырьевые товары рухнули вниз. В частности, нефть подешевела почти до $30/баррель, или до 13-летнего минимума. Объемы мировой торговли сокращаются в сравнении с прошлогодними показателями. Экономический рост в Китае замедляется, а в России и Бразилии ускоряется спад.
Куда катится мир? Главные финансовые институты утверждают, что в целом международные дела идут на поправку. Всемирный банк считает, что в 2015 году мировая экономика выросла на 2,4%, а в 2016-м ускорится до 2,9%. Международный валютный фонд оценивает ситуацию с еще большим оптимизмом, прогнозируя рост мирового ВВП на уровне 3,1% в 2015 году и 3,6% – в 2016-м.
Позитив виден и в Украине. «Экономика Украины, предположительно, сократилась на 12% в 2015 году после падения на 6,8% в 2014-м. В 2016-2017 годах мы прогнозирует рост экономики Украины на уровне 3,3%. Этому будет способствовать утихание конфликта на востоке страны, а также дальнейший прогресс в выполнении программы реформ при поддержке МВФ», – говорится в январском отчете Всемирного банка Global Economic Prospects.
В отчете сказано, что к 2017 году Украина сократит дефицит бюджета до 3,2% ВВП путем урезания пенсионных надбавок, сокращения рабочих мест в госсекторе и повышения тарифов на коммунальные услуги в сочетании с предоставлением адресной социальной помощи. Сбалансировав бюджет, Украина, по мнению авторов доклада, «внесет вклад» в общий экономический рост.
Однако в подъем глобальной экономики верят не все. Многие экономисты посыпают голову пеплом и пророчат миру катастрофу. Один из них Дэвид Хэггитс завел блог, в котором каждые несколько дней возвещает о наступлении «эпокалипсиса» – экономического апокалипсиса.
Forbes предлагает ознакомиться с самыми авторитетными плохими прогнозами на 2016 год, не забывая при этом, что именитые финансисты нередко делают такие предсказания со скрещенными за спиной пальцами, гонясь за дешевой славой или стремясь заработать на обмане.

Андерс Борг, экс-министр финансов Швеции
В статье, подготовленной для Международного экономического форума, Андерс Борг сообщил, что 2016 год будет годом вызовов и трудностей для глобальной экономики.
Экономический рост ускоряется благодаря восстановлению в США и других развитых странах, но оптимизма не видно. Его затеняют геополитические риски, рыночные волнения и популизм.
2016 год может войти в историю как год политического популизма. Из-за слабой экономической активности реальные зарплаты и потребительская способность будут разочаровывать людей. А когда реальность не оправдывает ожиданий, возникает недовольство, которым можно манипулировать. Американец Дональд Трамп, британец Джереми Корбин, грек Алексис Ципрас, француженка Марин Ле Пен, испанец Пабло Иглесиас Туррион и многие другие воспользуются стагнацией уровня жизни и растущими экономическими беспокойствами.
Выборы президента США станут главным политическим событием 2016 года. С глобальной точки зрения, ключевой вопрос в том, сможет ли следующий президент восстановить Соединенные Штаты как глобальную силу по обеспечению международной стабильности после явной летаргии администрации Барака Обамы. Еще один период отсутствия директив во внешней политике США и нежелания вводить войска в сложные регионы создаст серьезные проблемы в сфере безопасности.
Главной проблемой Европы в 2016 году останется миграционный кризис. По оценке ООН, в 2015 году более миллиона человек прибыли просить убежища в Европу. Всего в мире, по данным UNHCR, число насильственно перемещенных людей составило 60 млн в 2015 году, что на 40% больше, чем в 2014-м.
Ключевым событием, которое определит политическое будущее Европы на десятилетия вперед, станет референдум о членстве Британии в ЕС. Референдумы всегда связаны с неопределенностью. Неожиданные события могут толкнуть чашу весов в любом направлении. Если случится «Брекзит» (выход Британии из Евросоюза), экономические и политические последствия будут разрушительными. Европа станет более бюрократичной и централизованной.
Еще одну причину финансовой неопределенности представляет собой Россия. Низкая рождаемость и высокая преждевременная смертность от алкоголя у мужчин в сочетании с чрезмерной зависимостью российской экономики от природных ресурсов подрывают экономические перспективы этого государства. В долгосрочной перспективе при нынешнем режиме мощь этой страны будет снижаться. Но в краткосрочной перспективе любая соседняя страна, которая покажет признаки слабости, рискует тем, что Россия воспользуется ее слабостью.

Эндрю Робертс, главный экономист Royal Bank of Scotland

Второй по величине британский банк RBS, управляющий активами в $2 трлн, в письме своим клиентам сообщил, что «мир в беде», и посоветовал им «продавать все».
Продавайте все, кроме высококачественных облигаций. Время думать о том, как вернуть капитал, а не как на нем заработать. В переполненном зале двери аварийного выхода не пропустят всех…
Китай начал коренные преобразования, и они могут превратиться в снежный ком. Операции с акциями и долговыми бумагами становятся очень опасными, а мы еще даже не успели воспользоваться скудными достижениями последних двух лет…
Мировая торговля и глобальный рынок кредитов сокращаются, что создает неприятный коктейль для корпоративных балансов и доходов по акциям. Это покажется особенно устрашающим, если учесть, что глобальные ставки по кредитам достигают рекордных максимумов…
Акции на Уолл-стрит и европейских биржах, вероятно, упадут на 10-20%, а индекс FTSE просядет еще сильнее, поскольку в нем велика доля энергетических и сырьевых компаний. Цены на нефть Brent продолжат снижаться, при этом фигура «медвежий флаг» и уровни Фибоначчи указывают на пол в $16, на уровень, который последний раз наблюдался во время кризиса в Восточной Азии в 1999 году.

[Skylight]

Джордж Сорос, финансист с $27-миллиардным состоянием
Выступая в четверг на экономическом форуме в Шри-Ланке, самый знаменитый биржевой спекулянт Джордж Сорос высказал мнение, что мир стоит на пороге финансового кризиса такого же масштаба, что произошел в 2008 году.
Когда я смотрю на рынки, я вижу вызов, который мне напоминает финансовый кризис 2008 года. Китай имеет большие проблемы адаптации к сегодняшней ситуации. Он пытается найти новую модель роста, и девальвирует национальную валюту, перенося проблемы китайской экономики на остальной мир.

Майкл Барри, основатель и управляющий хедж-фонда Scion Capital
Знаменитый экономический предсказатель Майкл Барри, роль которого недавно сыграл Кристиан Бэйл в фильме «Игра на понижение», сообщил в интервью журналу New York Magazine, что тоже видит очертания нового кризиса, эпицентром которого станут США.
Я искренне надеялся, что мы войдем в новую эру персональной ответственности. Вместо этого мы с удвоенными усилиями обвиняем друг друга в проблемах, и это путь к беде. Между тем кризис 2008 года фактически сделал крупнейшие банки еще крупнее. А невыбираемое руководство Федерального резерва (ФРС) стало еще более влиятельным…
Политика нулевых процентных ставок разорвала «социальный договор» с несколькими поколениями. Тяжело работавшие американцы, отложившие пенсионные накопления, обнаружили, что их сбережения недостаточны…
Мы пытаемся стимулировать экономический рост легкими деньгами. Это не работает, но это единственный инструмент, используемый ФРС. Политика ФРС увеличивает разрыв между богатыми и бедными, что питает политический экстремизм, и это стопорит принятие решений в Вашингтоне. Похоже, мир движется в направлении негативных реальных процентных ставок в глобальном масштабе. Это токсично. Это неразумно для экономики. Мы создаем ужасающее напряжение в финансовой системе, и любая ошибка здесь, несомненно, может нарушить экономическую перспективу.

Альберт Эдвардс, глава департамента стратегического анализа мировой экономики банка Societe Generale
Сегодня, 15 января, индекс S&P 500 равнялся 1922. По прогнозу, высказанному Альбертом Эдвардсом на инвестиционной конференции в Лондоне, этот индекс пробьет отметку 666 – минимум, установленный во время финансового кризиса 2008 года – и опустится до 550.
Если я прав, индекс S&P обвалится до 550 – на 75% со своего последнего пика 2100. Очевидно, что это обернется катастрофой для экономики, и все усилия ФРС пойдут насмарку.
Нынешнее развитие глобальной экономики заталкивает США обратно в рецессию. Финансовый кризис пробудится вновь. Он будет в точности таким же тяжелым, как в 2008-2009 годах, и может принять очень уродливые очертания.
Центробанки создали огромный долговой пузырь, давящий на развивающиеся рынки и Китай. Этот пузырь заставляет валюты развивающихся стран девальвировать, что может создать дефляционную спираль и вызвать рецессию в США.
Мы наблюдаем массивную кредитную экспансию США. Это не настоящая экономическая активность. Это выдача займов для выкупа акций… Кризис произойдет, когда люди в Европе и США потеряют доверие, когда они засомневаются в том, что финансовые регуляторы знают, что делают.
Если глобальная экономика снова погрязнет в рецессии, это будет означать конец еврозоны. Такие страны, как Франция, Испания, Италия, могут не совладать с ростом безработицы, который вызовет еще одна рецессия. На что будет похож развал евро? Это будет машина Страшного суда, благоволящая экономике Германии.

[Skylight]

О чем говорили в Давосе: день четвертый

Четвертый, он же заключительный день Всемирного экономического форума в Давосе был полностью посвящен экономическим прогнозам и научно-техническому прогрессу. Речь шла о четвертой промышленной революции, развитии мировой науки и влиянии технических средств на жизнь человека. Таким завершением Форума организаторы как бы дали понять: политика и экономика не стоят и доллара без научных исследований, которые гораздо быстрее, чем кажется, меняют жизнь человечества.
Утром в Давосе были настроены говорить конструктивно и не на попсовые темы. Если вчера все активно обсуждали перформанс госсекретаря США Джона Керри и говорили в большей мере об абстрактных проблемах человечества, хотя в первые два дня речь шла о вполне конкретных: колебаниях на фондовых рынках, падении цен на нефть и решении миграционных проблем, то в последний день Форума популистская риторика отошла в сторону.

Без фанатизма
Первая сессия последнего дня Давоса была посвящена экономическим прогнозам на 2016 год и приятно удивила хорошими новостями. Согласно презентованным данным, 2016-й обещает стать благоприятным для мировой экономики, которая должна вырасти на 2,7%.
Причем рост будет наблюдаться во всех экономических регионах мира. Даже стагнирующей Южной Америке прогнозируют прирост в 0,6%. Рекордсменом в экономическом развитии должна стать Индия – благодаря ей рост в Азии составит 5,4%, даже с учетом проблем Китая.
Но, несмотря на оптимизм, генеральный директор Credit Suisse Тиджан Тиам назвал общие тенденции на мировом рынке худшим началом года. Он, к слову, дал интересное объяснение падения цен на нефть: «Есть доказательства того, что чистый спрос на нефть увеличивается. Следовательно, проблема в поставках, а не в спросе, и это является хорошей новостью для мировой экономики».
Главным итогом сессии стало выступление главы МВФ Кристин Лагард, которая, хотя и заявила, что нас всех ждет стабильный рост, назвала и четыре главных риска для мировой экономики в 2016 году:
«Тройная петля» Китая (переход от промышленности к услугам, возвращение на внутренний рынок и стимулирование потребления).
Дальнейшее падение цен на сырье.
Асинхронные процессы в денежно-кредитной политике.
Отток капитала из развивающихся стран в развитые.
Интересно, что в ходе обсуждения спикеры усомнились в объективности такого устоявшегося финансового показателя, как ВВП. Пример США показывает, что ВВП рос каждый год, кроме 2009-го, но реальный уровень жизни среднего американца сейчас хуже, чем четверть века назад. Это говорит о том, что оценка уровня развития стран сейчас должна быть гораздо сложнее и учитывать дополнительные факторы.

Восстание машин
«Будущий рост: технологичность и человекоцентризм» – так звучала тема центральной научной дискуссионной сессии, в которой, помимо спикеров, принял участие и основатель Форума Клаус Шваб.
По его мнению, четвертая промышленная революция должна быть максимально обращена к человеку: «Если мы хотим использовать все возможности и избежать ошибок в четвертой промышленной революции, мы должны переосмыслить наши представления о социально-экономическом развитии, ценностях, неприкосновенности частной жизни и собственности, и даже индивидуальности».
Шваб предупреждает, что человечеству придется вместе решать не только социально-экономические проблемы, но и морально-этические, которые возникают при развитии генной инженерии и продления жизни.
Со Швабом сложно спорить, ведь буквально в конце прошлого года Всемирная организация здравоохранения опубликовала доклад, согласно которому к 2050 году количество людей, чей возраст превышает 60 лет, удвоится, и достигнет 2 млрд человек. Это обстоятельство полностью перевернет структуру мировой экономики и социального обеспечения.
Председатель совета директоров Salesforce Марк Бениофф поднял другую фундаментальную тему – роботизацию труда, которая уже в ближайшее десятилетие может стать массовым явлением и оставить миллионы людей без работы.
«Растущие возможности искусственного интеллекта и генной инженерии могут выйти за пределы контроля своих создателей», – это не строка из сценария голливудского фантастического фильма, а прогноз Марка Бениоффа, человека, который, как никто другой, знает, что такое стремительное развитие технологий. «Каждой стране нужен министр будущего», – данный тезис Бениоффа, вне всякого сомнения, претендует на звание главной фразы Давоса-2016.

Профессор менеджмента в Школе менеджмента Слоуна Массачусетского технологического института Эрик Бринолфссон за человечество спокоен. По его мнению, существует масса сфер, которые никогда не будут доступны для выполнения роботам, а значит, трудовой потенциал человечества сохранится.
В противовес профессору возникает вопрос: если развитые страны найдут место своему среднему классу на рынке труда в новой экономике, то что будет с украинской занятостью, если транснациональные корпорации полностью перенесут роботизированное производство в нашу страну?
Прозвучали на сессии и интересные цифры. Так, согласно последним данным, пока развитие технологий приводит к обогащению лишь 1% населения планеты, уровень благосостояния остальных 99% от этого никак не поменялся. Это вызов, на который мировому истеблишменту придется отвечать.
Пока же спикеры сходятся во мнении, что перед внедрением каждого научного достижения в повседневную жизнь нужно быть готовыми не только к безусловным возможностям, но и к неизбежным рискам.

Остаться людьми
Точку в Давосе-2016 поставила сессия «Оставаясь человеком. Как мы можем сохранить нашу человечность в эпоху технологий?». Говорят, именно эта сессия была одной из самых главных для основателя Форума Клауса Шваба, что в очередной раз подчеркивает гуманистическую направленность Всемирного экономического форума.
В фокусе дискуссии была новая технология CRISPR, позволяющая осуществлять полноценное изменение человеческого ДНК. Будет ли человек чувствовать себя человеком, получив возможность полностью режиссировать собственную жизнь, включая лечение болезней, кажущихся сегодня неизлечимыми?
По мнению участников дискуссии, уже сейчас человечеству следует понимать, что любые инновации должны проходить обсуждение с общественностью, а ученые – работать вместе с философами и антропологами, которые могли бы прогнозировать влияние научных открытий на судьбу человечества.
Не обошлось и без обсуждения гаджетизации современной жизни и роли социальных сетей. Шваб озадачился вопросом, нормально ли современному человеку жить в непрекращающемся режиме онлайн? «Проблема не в современных средствах коммуникации, а в нашем отношении в ним», – парировала гражданская активистка Амира Яхьяуи.
Оригинальной была и профессор Шеффилдского университета Ангела Хоббс: «Еще какое-то время назад, в рамках доминирования религиозного мировоззрения, человечество жило с мыслью, что за ним постоянно наблюдает Бог. Чувствовать себя наблюдаемыми – часть человеческой природы».
Но мудрее всех оказался все же Шваб, предположив: «Возможно, человек, в отличие от машины, чувствует себя человеком, потому что верит в то, что есть жизнь после смерти, что после него что-то останется в мире?»
И пусть его вопрос показался спикерам из научной среды крайне иррациональным, Шваб доказал, что его детище – Всемирный экономический форум в Давосе – был, есть и будет для людей, хотя и затрудняющимся с ответом на вопрос, кто они есть в меняющемся мире.

[Alter Ego]

R.I.P. OPEC

For more than five decades OPEC has ruled the oil market with an iron fist. It decided how much oil to supply to the market, which would all but guarantee a fair price for its members. However, the first warning sign that the mighty OPEC had started to lose its grip on the oil market showed up in late 2014, when it broke from its previous practice of protecting a fair market price for oil by instead focusing on protecting its share of the oil market. Now, after two failed meetings at which the organization couldn't come to an agreement on a coordinated effort to stem the oversupply, it has become clear that the OPEC the oil market once knew and feared is no longer in existence.

http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/06/04/rip-opec-1960-2016.aspx

[Птиц]

RIP UN, RIP EU, RIP US

тока интересно в каком порядке